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Accounting Consolidation versus Capital Calculation:
The Conflict Over Asset-Backed Commercial Paper Programs
I. INTRODUCTION
On Christmas Eve' 2003, the Financial Accounting Standards
Board (FASB) 2 issued Revised Interpretation 46 (FIN 46R).3 FIN 46R
requires that the assets of certain Special Purpose Entities (SPEs) be
consolidated with the assets of the entity that was the "primary
beneficiary" of the SPE.4 In 2004, the Office of the Comptroller of the
Currency (OCC), the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System (FRB), the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), and
the Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS)5 determined that the assets of
SPEs consolidated by FIN 46R should, in some circumstances, not be
considered assets for the purpose of calculating capital requirements,
and issued new rules to exclude those SPE assets from the capital
calculations.6
This Note explains some of the key concepts underlying the
risk-based capital guidelines 7 and highlights key requirements of the
capital calculations. s It then examines the specific provisions of the
1. Todd Davenport, The Uneven Evolution of Accounting Standards, AM. BANKER,
July 28, 2004, at 16, available at http://www.americanbanker.com (last visited Nov. 9,
2004).
2. The FASB is assumed to be a proxy for the SEC, given the SEC's statutory
authority over accounting standards. 15 U.S.C. § 77s(a) (2000).
3. FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BOARD (FASB), INTERPRETATION No. 46,
CONSOLIDATION OF VARIABLE INTEREST ENTITIES: AN INTERPRETATION OF ARB No. 51 (rev.
Dec. 2003), available at http://www.fasb.org/pdf/fin%2046R.pdf; [hereinafter FIN 46R].
The original FASB Interpretation No. 46, available at http://www.fasb.org/pdf/fln%
2046.pdf, was issued in January 2003. The difference between the original and the revised
FIN 46R is not material to this Note.
4. See FIN 46R, supra note 3, at 15.
5. Risk-Based Capital Guidelines; Capital Adequacy Guidelines; Capital Maintenance:
Consolidation of Asset-Backed Commercial Paper Programs and Other Issues, 69 Fed. Reg.
44,908 (July 28, 2004), (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 3; 12 C.F.R. pts. 208, 225; 12 C.F.R.
pt. 325; 12 C.F.R. pt. 567) [hereinafter New Rule]. While this Note is generally based on
the interagency guidelines, it considers only the OCC provisions in detail.
6. Id.
7. See discussion infra Part II.
8. See discussion infra Part III.A.
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new capital rules, 9 questions whether or not the new rules comport with
sound policy,'l and finally considers the differing goals of the Securities
and Exchange Commission (SEC) and bank regulators that gave rise to
the divergent rules."
II. BACKGROUND
A. Key Concepts for Understanding Risk-Based Capital Guidelines
Leverage is a concept of financial management that a firm can
enhance its profitability by borrowing, rather than seeking additional
equity investment from its owners, to finance expansion and growth of
the business. 12  The concept of leverage is especially attractive to a
corporation, because each shareholder's loss is limited to her investment
in her shares, 13 while the potential return is unlimited, subject only to
the profits generated by the business.14 Leverage is less attractive to the
creditors of the business, who generally are limited to a fixed rate of
return on the upside, without participation in the profits, while also
being exposed to the loss of at least part of their investment. 15 Banks
make significant use of leverage and have a high proportion of liabilities
to capital. 16
A large portion of any bank's creditors are depositors with
checking or savings accounts. 17 While institutional lenders can and do
9. See discussion infra Part III.B.
10. See discussion infra Part IV.
11. See discussion infra Part V.
12. See generally RICHARD A. BREALEY & STEWART C. MYERS, PRINCIPLES OF
CORPORATE FINANCE 448-57 (5th ed. 1996) (explaining the basic principles of leverage).
Leverage is useful so long as the rate of return is higher than the rate paid on funds
borrowed. Id.
13. See EUGENE F. BRIGHAM & JOEL F. HOUSTON, FUNDAMENTALS OF FINANCIAL
MANAGEMENT 10 (2d concise ed. 1999).
14. See generally BREALEY & MYERS, supra note 12, at 451 (discussing differences
between investing in debt versus equity).
15. See BRIGHAM & HOUSTON, supra note 13, at 21. Note that in case of business
failure, creditors are paid first, before shareholders, mitigating the creditors' risk somewhat.
See DAVID G. EPSTEIN, ET AL., NINE QUESTIONS: SECURED DEBT DEALS IN THE 21ST
CENTURY 7 (2003).
16. LISSA L. BROOME & JERRY W. MARKHAM, REGULATION OF BANK FINANCIAL
SERVICE ACTIVITIES 578 (2d ed. 2004).
17. Id. at 487. The federal government created the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation (FDIC) in 1933 to insure deposits after an epidemic of bank failures at the
beginning of the Great Depression. Id. at 44-45. The current limit of FDIC coverage is
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insist on restrictive covenants which legally limit a borrower's ability to
put the lender's funds at risk through excessive leverage,' 8 the federal
government has taken on the role of protecting bank depositors, in part
through regulation of a bank's ability to employ leverage. 19  For
example, the government regulates banks by limiting participation in
the FDIC to "safe and sound" banks.2°  Bank regulators have
determined that excessive leverage, that is, inadequate capital, leads to
unsafe and unsound banks and have issued rules requiring that
participating banks have adequate capital.2 ' Insistence on adequate
capital is one way of making sure that the bank's shareholders are
bearing a sufficient portion of the risk, not leaving the risk to be borne
by the bank's creditors or the FDIC.
22
Another way of understanding adequate capital is to view
capital as net worth, or the residual after subtracting liabilities from
assets.23 Net profits increase net worth, net losses decrease it.24 The
greater a bank's capital, the more it can absorb net losses before
liabilities exceed assets.25 If liabilities exceed assets, the entity is said to
have a negative net worth, or to be insolvent.2 6 If the assets are not
sufficient to pay the depositors in the liquidation of an insolvent bank,
the FDIC must make up the difference.27 This gives added importance
to the bank leverage, or capitalization, in the eyes of the FDIC. 8
Bank regulators determine the adequacy of capital by dividing
capital by assets to calculate the capital ratio, a higher ratio meaning
$100,000 per depositor. 12 U.S.C. § 182 1(a)(1)(B) (2000); see also BROOME & MARKHAM,
supra note 16, at 518-19.
18. See generally Morey M. McDaniel, Bondholders and Corporate Governance, 41
Bus. LAW. 413 (1986).
19. See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 1811(a) (2000) (establishing the statutory authority for the
FDIC).
20. See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 1816(2) (2000) (requiring "safe and sound" banks to have an
adequate capital structure).
21. See 12 U.S.C. § 1818(a)(2)(A)(ii) (2000) (recognizing the necessity of safe and
sound banks as a prerequisite to insuring their deposits).
22. Sophisticated commercial lenders use bond covenants and other tools to manage
risk. See Zvi BODIE, ET AL., INVESTMENTS 471-476 (6th ed. 2005).




27. Id. at 579.
28. Id.
2932005]
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that a bank's shareholders are bearing more risk vis d vis its creditors.29
Banking law further requires that the capital ratio calculation be risk-
based.30  Banks are unique in that most of their creditors can demand
immediate repayment; for example, checking and savings accounts are
repayable on creditors' demand, 31 requiring a very high level of
liquidity.32 On the other side of the balance sheet, most bank assets are
partially dependent on the productivity of other entities.33 That is, bank
assets are in large part monetary assets, particularly investments in other
businesses in the form of loans.34 Since the productivity of the other
firm is largely out of the bank's direct control, an extra layer of risk is
added to bank assets, which is not present to the same degree in other
types of industries, where the owners control the productivity of the
assets, subject to various environmental factors, and where monetary
assets are a much smaller proportion of total assets and generally consist
29. 12 C.F.R. § 3 (2004) (OCC regulations); see also 12 C.F.R. §§ 208, 225 (2004)
(FRB regulations); 12 C.F.R. § 325 (2004) (FDIC regulations); 12 C.F.R. § 567 (2004)
(OTS regulations). The capital ratio is only a starting point, many other factors are
reviewed to determine the capital adequacy of banks. 12 C.F.R. § 3.
30. See generally WILLIAM LOVETT, BANKING AND FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS LAW IN A
NUTSHELL 127-33 (5th ed. 2001). Assets are ranked according to risk and adjusted
accordingly before being entered into the calculation. See discussion infra Part III.A.
31. BROOME & MARKHAM, supra note 16, at 487. In 2000. larger banks (assets of more
than one billion dollars) financed 44% of their assets with "core" deposits, smaller banks
(assets of less than one billion dollars) financed 70% of their assets with "core" deposits. Id.
at 487. As an example, core deposits are Wachovia's largest source of funding, providing
$205 billion of Wachovia's $401 billion in assets in 2003 (51% of assets). WACHOVIA, INC.
2003 ANNUAL REPORT 67, 78 (2004), available at http://www.wachovia.com/file/WB2003
annualreport.pdf (last visited Jan. 10, 2005). Deposits include savings, negotiable orders of
withdrawal (NOW), money-market, non-interest bearing and other consumer time deposits.
Id. at 38. By contrast, Wachovia's stockholders' equity funded only $32 billion of the assets
(8% of assets). Id. at 78.
32. Liquidity is the ease at which an asset can be converted into cash. BRIGHAM &
HOUSTON, supra note 13, at 11.
33. Rather than buying and holding title to the productive assets of a business, banks
typically invest by lending to a business. BROOME & MARKHAM, supra note 16, at 317.
Productivity of the bank's debtors is not the only factor in repayment of the bank's
investment plus interest. Financiers talk about the "3Cs" of credit - capacity (productivity),
character, and capital. EPSTEIN, ET AL., supra note 15, at 3.
34. See, e.g., WACHOVIA, INC., supra note 31, at 78. Wachovia had $266 billion in
securities and loans or 66% of total assets of $401 billion, almost six times more than the
$4.6 billion in premises and equipment which make up just over 1% of total assets on its
2003 balance sheet. Id. In comparison, Lowe's (Home Improvement Stores) balance sheet
is almost completely opposite. Less than 3% of its assets are accounts receivable and
securities, while 63% is property. LOWE'S COMPANIES, INC. 2003 ANNUAL REPORT 27
(2004), available at http://images.lowes.com/animate/Lowes2003AnnualReport.pdf (last
visited Jan. 10, 2005).
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of low risk items like short-term trade debt and temporary investments
of excess cash. 5
B. Basic Concepts of Securitization and Special Purpose Entities
(SPEs)
Securitization is a form of borrowing.36 Debt securities are
distinguished from the debt itself because debt securities involve
standardized forms and instruments, while debt is customized for the
particular parties in the transaction.37 Because of their standardized
form, debt securities can be easily traded in a secondary market.38 This
tends to lower the cost of borrowing for the issuer of securities
compared to the debtor because the security is more liquid; it can be
turned into cash by the investor more quickly than debt.39 Securitization
is not only used for new lending, but can also be used to turn illiquid
assets already on the lender's books into liquid assets.40
A special purpose entity (SPE)41 can be formed to issue
securities to obtain financing. 42  Basic securitization involves the
transfer of illiquid assets embodying certain future payment rights to the
SPE.43 The paradigm example of securitization of an existing asset is a
securitization of a pool of home mortgage loans.44 The long period over
which the cash flows from the typical home mortgage are received
makes the asset very illiquid.4' By transferring that pool of home
mortgage loans to an SPE, and having the SPE issue securities that are
backed by the cash flows from the mortgageg, the originator of
35. See, e.g., LOWE'S COMPANIES, INC., supra note 34, at 27.
36. 1 TAMAR FRANKEL, SECURITIZATION: STRUCTURED FINANCING, FINANCIAL ASSET
POOLS, AND ASSET-BACKED SECURITIES § 1.1 (1991).
37. Id.
38. See id.
39. See BRIGHAM & HOUSTON, supra 13, at 11; see also JASON H.P. KRAVITr,
SECURITIZATION OF FINANCIAL ASSETS § 1.01, at 1-7 (Jason H. P. Kravitt, ed., 1991, 2004).
40. FRANKEL, supra note 36, § 1.1.
41. SPEs are sometimes called Special Purpose Vehicles (SPVs). STEPHEN L.
SCHWARCZ, ET AL., SECURITIZATION, STRUCTURED FINANCE AND CAPITAL MARKETS § 1.03,
at 6 n. 12, (2004).
42. BARRY J. EPSTEIN & ABBAS ALl MIRZA, IAS: 2004 INTERPRETATION OF
INTERNATIONAL ACCOUNTING AND FINANCIAL REPORTING STANDARDS 497 (2004).
43. See KRAViTr, supra note 39, § 1.01, at 1-3.
44. See FRANKEL, supra note 36, § 1.3.
45. See BRIGHAM & HOUSTON, supra 13, at 11.
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mortgage (transferor) can receive cash immediately without having to
wait for the borrowers' monthly checks.4 6 Almost any cash flow can be
securitized, for example, credit card receivables, automobile loans and
leases, business loans, equipment loans, 47 and even estimated royalty
payments.48
Securitization has a number of benefits, the chief one being that
financing with SPEs can be done at a lower cost than traditional
financing, primarily by lowering the lender's risk.4 9  Besides the
liquidity issues noted above,5 ° securitization can separate desirable
assets from the risk associated with the transferor as a whole, 5' resulting
in lower risk to the creditor. 52 The transfer can be structured so that it is
bankruptcy remote, meaning the underlying assets have been sold to the
SPE and are not available to the creditor of the originator.5 3 In other
words, if the debtor borrows money on its general good credit and
ultimately goes bankrupt, the creditor will have to stand in line with the
other creditors, enduring the time and administrative costs of a
bankruptcy proceeding, with little hope of receiving back all the money
it loaned.54 If the creditor instead lends money to an SPE secured by the
cash flows of one particular asset, then it will only need to fight with the
other lenders to the SPE, which should be much smaller in number than
those of the sponsor of the SPE.55 Further, if the SPE's securities are
rated by an external credit rating agency,56 the borrower can finance
even more cheaply if the SPE's debt is rated better than that of the
company which transfers the assets to the SPE.57
Besides securitizing the loans they originate,58 banks also
46. See KRAvITr, supra note 39, § 1.01, at 1-7.
47. Id. § 1.02, at 1-9.
48. Id. at 1-10.
49. Steven L. Schwarcz, The Alchemy of Asset Securitization, 1 STAN. J.L. Bus. & FIN.
133, 137 (1994).
50. See supra text accompanying notes 38-39.
51. See Schwarcz, supra note 49, at 133.
52. Id. at 134.
53. Id. at 135; see also KRAVITr, supra note 39, § 3.04, at 3-24.
54. See Schwarcz, supra note 49, at 135.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 136. Standard and Poor's and Moody's Investor Service, Inc., are external
credit rating agencies. EPSTEIN, ET AL., supra note 15, at 3-4.
57. See Schwarcz, supra note 49, at 136.
58. See supra text accompanying note 47.
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intermediate SPEs between transferor customers and third parties.59
This can further lower the interest rate paid to the creditor, again by
lowering the creditor's risk.60 For example, the transferor may ask the
intermediary bank to provide credit enhancement, guaranteeing
repayment in the event the underlying asset ceases to perform, thereby
minimizing default risk.61 The credit enhancement may be direct, e.g.,
by issuing a letter of credit,62 or indirect, e.g., by buying subordinated
securities .63
The intermediary bank can also lower liquidity risk to SPE
creditors by offering liquidity facilities.64  Liquidity facilities are
especially useful if the securities issued by the SPE are short term, e.g.,
commercial paper,65 where the main risk is liquidity risk, not default
risk.6 6 Liquidity is needed in case of a timing mismatch between
payments to be made to the SPE's creditors and the cash flows
generated by the assets backing the commercial paper.67 If the timing of
cash flows from either collections on the underlying assets or from
issuing new commercial paper does not permit payment of maturing
obligations, 68  an intermediary bank may ensure that cash flows are
available when needed by lending to, or purchasing assets from, the
69SPE program.
It is also common for banks to provide "multi-seller
securitization conduits," which are SPEs used by a number of
borrowers. 70 This arrangement further lowers the cost of financing by
minimizing risk through diversification and providing economies of
scale in relation to transaction costs."t  Typically these multi-seller
59. New Rule, supra note 5, at 44,908-09.
60. See Schwarcz, supra note 49, at 135.
61. Id. at 139-40.
62. Id. at 139.
63. Id. at 143-44.
64. Id. at 141.
65. Commercial paper is a promissory note evidencing a loan of nine months or less.
BROOME& MARKHAM, supra note 16, at 898.
66. Id. at 140-4 1.
67. Id.
68. See Schwarcz, supra note 49, at 140-41.
69. New Rule, supra note 5, at 44,910.
70. See Schwarcz, supra note 49, at 140.
71. Id.
29720051
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conduits will issue commercial paper to the creditors of the SPE.72
Other advantages to borrowers, besides a lower cost of
financing, include removal of financial assets and related indebtedness
from the originator's balance sheet.73 By staying off the balance sheet,
the SPE financing transactions do not increase the debt-to-equity ratio
of the originator of the loan.74 This is especially important to financial
institutions because of the capital required to be held for assets.75
Further, the interest on the debt securities that are issued by the SPE do
not appear on the income statement of the originator, resulting in lower
expenses and higher profits than if the originator borrowed directly
rather than utilizing an SPE.76 Another benefit of securitization is that it
matches assets with liabilities, so that cash is available to pay liabilities
as they come due.77
Asset Backed Commercial Paper (ABCP) programs are a
particular type of bank sponsored SPE.78 An ABCP program raises cash
by issuing commercial paper,7 9 rather than longer term securities, which
is often rated by an independent rating agency.80 The ABCP program
then provides funds to the bank's customer by purchasing asset pools
from it.,,
C. The Enron Effect
Enron's downfall, brought about in part by its use of SPEs to
deliberately understate its liabilities 2 and overstate its profits, is well-
known.83 SPEs probably did not, however, deserve the black eye they
72. Id. at 140-41.
73. KRAvirr, supra note 39, § 1.01, at 1-6.
74. Id. Increases in the debt-to-equity ratio may indicate that the company will lack
sufficient cash to service its debt and/or pay dividends to shareholders. An increase in the
debt-to-equity ratio may harm the company's credit rating, increasing the cost of financing,
or depressing the price of its stock. Id.
75. Id; see also discussion supra Part II.A.
76. See Schwarcz, supra note 49, at 143.
77. KRAViTr, supra note 39, § 1.01.




82. By understating it liabilities, Enron improved its debt-to-equity, or leverage, ratio.
See discussion supra Part II.A.
83. Steven L. Schwarcz, Enron and the Use and Abuse of Special Purpose Entities in
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received from Enron.84 Though Enron's SPEs shared the name, they
differed substantially from the financing SPEs discussed in the
preceding section.85 Enron's SPEs, unlike typical financing SPEs, were
not owned and managed by an independent company.86 Since Enron's
SPEs were "incestuous, 87 and were not managed at arms' length, they
could be, and were, manipulated in an accounting shell game to conceal
the company's liabilities.88 Further, Enron's auditors, charged with the
duty to provide an independent examination of the SPE transactions,
were themselves compromised by lucrative non-audit contracts with
Enron.89
Enron's SPEs did not unambiguously transfer the risk of
nonpayment or delayed payment from the company to the SPE and its
investors.90 Instead, they left Enron to bear the risk when the SPEs
failed. 9' Since Enron continued to bear the risk of nonpayment by its
SPEs, a fair presentation of Enron's financial position should have
consolidated those SPEs onto Enron's balance sheet.92 If the liabilities
had been put on Enron's balance sheet as the SPEs were created, the
rising debt levels might have alerted lenders and investors to Enron's
troubles much earlier and avoided its spectacular collapse.93
Corporate Structures, 70 U. CIN. L. REV. 1309, 1309 (2002); see generally BETHANY
MCLEAN & PETER ELKIND, THE SMARTEST GUYS IN THE RooM 157-58 (2003). One text
simply referred to "large and notorious financial frauds" when beginning its discussion of
SPEs. EPSTEIN & ALl MIZRA, supra note 42, at 497. The story even reached the other side
of the globe, the author hearing of it in Ethiopia via CNN! In its background information
for FIN 46, FASB spoke of "enterprises [that] have entered into arrangements using variable
interest entities that appear to be designed to avoid reporting assets and liabilities for which
they are responsible, to delay reporting losses that have already been incurred, or to report
gains that are illusory." FIN 46R, supra note 3, App. E I E5, at 59. Enron was alleged to
have been motivated by all three. MCLEAN & ELKIND, supra, at 158.
84. Schwarcz, supra note 83, at 1318.
85. See supra Part II.B.
86. Schwarcz, supra note 83, at 1318.
87. Id. at 1312-13.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 1313.
90. Id. at 1316.
91. Id.
92. Schwarcz, supra note 83, at 1315.
93. McLEAN & ELKIND, supra note 83, at 158.
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D. Essential Elements of FIN 46R
The idea that financial statements of related companies should
be consolidated and include all the enterprises under common control
94
has been generally accepted for a long time.95 The traditional rule for
control has been the existence of a simple majority voting interest of the
parent company in the subsidiary. 96  Further, SPEs were to be
consolidated by the beneficiary if the owner of record had no more than
a nominal capital interest in the SPE.97 These tests, however, emphasize
the legal form of the entities and not the substance of the underlying
transactions.98 A concern for substance over form led the Standing
Interpretations Committee (SIC) of the International Accounting
Standards Board (IASB) 99 to issue SIC 12, Consolidation - Special
Purpose Entities in November 1998.00 SIC 12 advocated a more
standards based "beneficial interest" test for consolidation, as opposed
to the traditional rule focusing on form.'01 Logically, the company
which receives the benefits of the SPE must also be bearing its risks,
and if risks are being borne, they should be revealed to potential and
94. EPSTEIN & ALl MIZRA, supra note 42, at 497.
95. See generally ANDREW HARIED, ET AL., ADVANCED ACCOUNTING 49 (6th ed. 1994)
(outlining the reasons for and history of accounting consolidation of related entities).
96. FIN 46R, supra note 3, I at 8.
97. See JUDITH WEISS, MILLER GAAP FROM THE EMERGING ISSUES TASK FORCE:
EXPLANATION OF EITF ISSUES & CONSENSUSES 19.48-49 (1996). Nominal was defined in the
SEC comments to EITF Issue 90-15 as less than 3% of the capital investment in the SPE. Id.
Note that EITF Issue 90-15 was superceded by FIN 46R. FIN 46R, supra note 3, App. E T
E23, at 63.
98. EPSTEIN & ALI MIZRA, supra note 42, at 497. Emphasizing form over substance is a
key accounting concept. FASB STATEMENT OF FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING CONCEPTS 2, App.
B, 160, at 52 (May 1980), available at http://www.fasb.org/pdf/con2.pdf. An example of
form over substance is in accounting for leases. DONALD E. KIESO & JERRY J. WEYGANDT,
INTERMEDIATE ACCOUNTING 780 (4th ed. 1983). According to the legal form, the lessee
does not own the assets it leases, and by the classic definition of asset - what the business
owns - those leased assets should not be included on the balance sheet. Id. Generally
accepted accounting principles (GAAP) recognize, however, that if a leased asset in
substance transfers the benefits and risks incident to ownership to the lessee, then the leased
asset should be included on the lessee's balance sheet, and the present value of the future
lease payments is included in liabilities. Id.
99. IASB standards are now required for member countries of the European Union
(EU). Regulation (EC) No 1606/2002 of the European Parliament of and of the Council
(July 19, 2002), http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/pri/en/oj/dat/2002/_243A1_2432002091 len000I
0004.pdf. FASB has called for convergence of the two sets of standards - IASB and FASB.
See, e.g., FASB Press Release, available at http://www.iasb.org/docs/press/2002 prlS.pdf.
100. STUDENT ACCT., Sept. 2004, at 64.
101. EPSTEIN & ALl MIZRA, supra note 42, at 497.
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actual investors on the balance sheet. To determine whether a beneficial
interest exists, SIC 12 looks at the substance of the relationship between
the SPE and its sponsor.10 2  If the sponsor either benefits from, or
otherwise has the rights and risks of ownership, the SPE should be
consolidated by the sponsor.'
0 3
Unfortunately, unlike the SIC, the Financial Accounting
Standards Board (FASB) did not act in 1998. It reacted in response to
bad press the accounting profession received in the wake of Enron in
issuing FIN 46.'04 Perhaps because it acted under pressure in preparing
the first interpretation, the original FIN 46 was not acceptable, and
FASB almost immediately issued a revision, FIN 46R, in December
2003.105
FIN 46R 10 6 took a position similar to that of SIC 12.107 It
intends for consolidation to include entities where there is a controlling
financial interest, determined by the benefits received or risk taken,
regardless of whether the consolidating entity holds voting rights. 108
Even if fifty-one percent of the voting rights in an entity belong to
another party, the primary beneficiary'°9 is to consolidate that entity. 1 0
Under FIN 46R, identity of the entity which should consolidate
a SPE is certain if: (1) the SPE is designed to have adequate capital; (2)
the shareholders control the entity with voting rights; and (3) profits and
102. A sponsor establishes the program, approves the participating sellers, approves the
asset pools to be purchased or administers the program by monitoring the assets, arranging
for debt placement, or compiling monthly reports and ensures compliance with documents
or policy. New Rule, supra note 5, at 44,908 n.2.
103. EPSTEIN & ALl MIZRA, supra note 42, at 497 (citing SIC 12).
104. J. Paul Forrester, et al., Is my SPE a VIE Under FIN-46R, and If So, So What? (Mar.
29, 2004), at http://www.securitization.net/pdf/bdo-mbr&m-fin46r.pdf (last visited Jan. 28,
2004).
105. FIN 46R, supra note 3, at 4. The revision addressed "certain technical corrections
and implementation issues," Id., App. D D2, at 40, and did not significantly affect the new
rule under consideration in this Note. New Rule, supra note 5, at 44,909.
106. FIN 46R was intended to improve financial reporting by promoting consistency
between enterprises, and by providing more complete information about resources,
obligations, risks and opportunities of the SPE's beneficiary. FIN 46R, supra note 3, at 7.
Improved financial reporting provides information useful in making economic decisions. Id.
at 7.
107. Id. at 5-6; see also supra text accompanying notes 100-103.
108. FIN 46R, supra note 3, at 5-6.
109. Id. The primary beneficiary is the entity that absorbs expected losses or receives
returns, as it were the owner. Id. at 6.
110. Id.
2005]
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losses are allocated in proportion to holdings.1 ' If any of these
elements do not exist, and the identity of the consolidating entity is not
certain, the SPE is a Variable Interest Entity (VIE). 112 In the case of a
VIE, the accountant looks to each stakeholder (equity holders, creditors,
sponsors, guarantors, servicers) to determine who should consolidate
it." 3 "The stakeholder who holds the majority of the entity's risks or
rewards (or both) is the primary beneficiary and must consolidate the
VIE."' 1 4 This is a wholesale departure from the traditional rule based on
a controlling ownership interest."15
Because many bank sponsors of ABCP programs meet the
primary beneficiary tests of FIN 46R, 1 6 they are required to consolidate
those programs onto their balance sheets." 7 Consolidating the assets
and liabilities of any SPEs, including ABCP programs, will lower the
risk-based capital ratio from what it would have been without the
promulgation of FIN 46R," 8 if the SPE has a lower capital ratio than the
sponsoring bank. A lower capital ratio makes the bank appear less "safe
and sound," and potentially at risk of violating its capital
requirements. 19
III. THE NEW RULES FOR ASSET-BACKED COMMERCIAL PAPER
PROGRAMS
A. Development of Risk-based Capital Guidelines
Current Risk-based Capital Guidelines (RBCGs) are rooted in
the multilateral 1988 Basel Agreement, 120 which recognized ever-
growing global economic interdependence and competition in the
Ill. Id. at4.
112. New Rule, supra note 5, at 44,909 n.3.
113. Id.
114. Id. (emphasis added).
115. See supra text accompanying notes 95-96.
116. New Rule, supra note 5, at 44,909. The deadline for implementation of FIN 46R
has still not arrived, but the differences between FIN 46 and FIN 46R did not directly affect
issues relevant to the new FDIC Rule. Id. The effects of FIN 46 seen in the balance sheets
of major banks are equally applicable to FIN 46R. Id.
117. Id.
118. See discussion supra text accompanying note 29.
119. See supra text accompanying notes 20-22.
120. See Risk-Based Capital Guidelines, 54 Fed. Reg. 4168, 4177 (Jan. 27, 1989)
(codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 3) (providing useful background information for the guidelines).
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banking industry. 12' The Basel Agreement was an effort to harmonize
standards in order to create a level playing field for regulation of banks
in the industrialized world. 2 2  Though euphemistically called
"guidelines," the RBCGs are enforced by the bank regulatory agencies
in the United States. 23 A bank whose capital drops below the standard
is potentially subject to the loss of FDIC insurance, 124 fines, and civil
penalties.
125
The basic requirement of the RBCGs is that banks and other
financial institutions must maintain a total capital ratio of at least eight
percent. 26 An eight percent total capital ratio means a dollar's worth of
assets must be supported with eight cents in capital. 127 In other words,
eight dollars worth of investment by the owners can be leveraged with
no more than ninety-two dollars of debt.
128
Rather than using a simple balance sheet capital to asset
calculation, the RBCGs recognize that not all bank assets are
susceptible to loss, and that 'some assets are less risky than others.
129
For instance, cash, 30 gold in the vault,
13' and government securities 3 2
have neither liquidity nor default risk, and they can easily be converted
into cash as needed to meet depositors' demands. 133 Therefore, they are
given a zero percent risk rating, and no capital is required to support
them. 134 Next in the continuum are assets conditionally guaranteed by
the United States government. 135 They are accorded a twenty percent
risk weight, 136 meaning that one dollar and sixty cents 137 of owners'
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. See supra text accompanying note 5.
124. 12 U.S.C. § 1818(c) (2000).
125. 12 U.S.C. § 3909(d) (2000); see also 12 U.S.C. § 1818(b)(5) (2000).
126. 12 C.F.R. pt. 3 app. A § l(b)(1) (2004). The basic ratio is found by dividing capital
by assets. More precisely, the ratio is calculated by dividing Tier 1 and Tier 2 capital by
risk adjusted assets plus certain off balance sheet exposures. Id. at § l(a)(1). See infra notes
176-177.
127. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
128. Assets = Liabilities + Capital. In this example, 100 = 92 + 8, and 8/100 = 8%.
129. See 12 C.F.R. pt. 3 app. A § l(b)(1) (2004).
130. Id. § 3(a)(1)(i).
131. Id. § 3(a)(1)(vi).
132. Id. § 3(a)(1)(iii).
133. See supra text accompanying notes 30-31.
134. 12 C.F.R. pt. 3 app. A § 3.
135. Id. § 3(a)(2)(v).
136. Id.
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capital is required for every one hundred dollars of asset."'
The third category includes loans backed by first mortgages on
homes, 139 and obligations of a public sector entity in a member country
of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
(OECD), repayable solely from revenues generated by the project
financed by the obligation. 140 These assets are given a fifty-percent risk
weight, meaning that four dollars1 4' of owners' capital is required to
support each one hundred dollars of assets. 1
42
The fourth category of assets comprises all assets not included
in another category. 143 This category includes all bank loans, which are
the largest dollar amount of bank assets.' 44 They are given a one-
hundred percent risk weight, which means a hundred dollars' worth of
loans must be supported by the entire eight dollars of capital as called
for by the guidelines. 145 Another example of an asset in the one hundred
percent risk category is the land and buildings for the bank's
headquarters and branches. 46
Besides assigning risk weights to the various assets appearing
on the bank's balance sheet, the RBCGs recognize that the nature of
banking means that banks sometimes have risks not captured on the
balance sheet. 147 Off-balance sheet commitments can imperil a bank's
ability to meet depositors' demands in the same way as a defaulting
loan reported on the bank's books. 48 The RBCGs, therefore, require
off-balance sheet risks to be added to a bank's book assets before
calculation of the capital ratio. 1
49
Off-balance sheet risks are divided into four classes. 50 Credit
137. $1.60 = 20% x 8% x $100.
138. 12 C.F.R. pt. 3 app. A, § 3(a)(2) (2004).
139. Id. § 3(a)(3)(iii).
140. Id. § 3(a)(3)(i).
141. $4.00 = 50% x 8% x $100.
142. 12 C.F.R. pt. 3 app. A § 3(a)(3) (2004).
143. Id. § 3(a)(4).
144. See BROOME & MARKHAM, supra note 16, at 317.
145. 12 C.F.R. pt. 3 app. A § 3(a)(4).
146. Id.
147. See 12 C.F.R. pt. 3 app. A § 3(b) (2004). For example, credit guarantees do not
appear on a bank's balance sheet. KIESO & WEYGANDT, supra note 98, at 461-62.





conversion factors are applied to each class of risk, then the risks are
assigned to the various risk categories listed above. 51  The first class
includes agreements to purchase assets at some future date (e.g., put
options), and recourse and direct credit substitutes. 52 These obligations
are assigned a one hundred percent credit conversion factor. 153  The
second class of off-balance sheet risks includes performance bonds and
performance-based standby letters of credit.154 These risks are assigned
a fifty percent conversion factor, 55 so half of the amount of these off-
balance sheet risks is added to the appropriate category of risk-based
assets.
A third class includes commercial letters of credit, for example,
letters that finance shipment, collateralized by the goods shipped.
156
These risks are assigned a twenty percent conversion factor, and one-
fifth of the amount of each is added to the appropriate category of risk-
based assets.
57
The fourth class includes the unused portion of commitments
with an original maturity of one year or less that also meet certain
criteria, 15 and the unused portion of commitments greater than one
year, if bank has the right to cancel the commitment based on a review
of the borrower's financial condition. 59  These commitments are
considered remote enough that the bank is not likely to be at risk for
paying on the commitments, and they are assigned a zero percent
conversion factor. 160  With the zero percent conversion factor, these
commitments do not affect the capital ratio.
16 1
151. See supra notes 129-149 and accompanying text.
152. Id. § 3(b)(1)(iv).
153. Id. § 3(b)(1).
154. Id. § 3(b)(2)(i). Performance bonds guarantee a party's performance, such as a
subcontractors' performance on a construction contract. Id.
155. 12 C.F.R. pt. 3 app. A § 3(b)(2) (2004).
156. Id. § 3(b)(3)(i).
157. Id. § 3(b)(3).
158. Id. § 3(b)(4)(i).
159. Id. § 3(b)(4)(ii).
160. Id. § 3(b)(5).
161. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
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B. The New Rule for Asset-Backed Commercial Paper Programs
When FASB promulgated FIN 46R, 162 it spread the net over
both Enron-type SPEs apparently designed to defraud, and legitimate
financing SPEs designed to reduce risk to investors and lower the cost
of financing to borrowers.163 Under the analysis of FIN 46R, many
banks were deemed to be the primary beneficiary of their bank-
sponsored SPEs.164 As the primary beneficiary, a sponsoring bank is
required to consolidate the SPE onto its balance sheet. 165 Most of the
SPEs for which consolidation was required were ABCP programs.
1 66
Upon review, bank regulators determined that the blanket
provisions of FIN 46R were not appropriate for ABCP programs.1 67
ABCP programs did need, however, some recognition in the RBCG
capital ratio calculation. 68  The regulators also concluded that the
higher capital required by inclusion of the SPEs on bank balance sheets
put domestic banks at a competitive disadvantage versus foreign banks,
who are not required to consolidate ABCP programs onto their balance
sheets and thus were able to leverage their capital to a greater extent.169
A new RBCG promulgation was the result of that review. 7°
The revised RBCG rules are relatively simple and set forth four relevant
provisions: 1) ABCP program assets consolidated under FIN 46R are
excluded from the RBCG capital ratio calculation;' 7' 2) the liquidity
facilities offered by some ABCP programs are included in the capital
calculation; 7 2 3) an asset quality test for those liquidity facilities is
mandated in calculating their conversion factors; 17 3 and 4) overlapping
risk exposures are included only once in the capital ratio calculation. 17 4
162. See discussion supra Part II.D.
163. See supra notes 49, 83 and accompanying text.
164. See discussion supra Part lI.D.
165. See discussion supra Part II.D.
166. New Rule, supra note 5, at 44,908.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 44,910. But see supra note 99 and accompanying text (noting that European
Union member countries are now required to follow IASB standards, which presumably
include SIC 12, and may result in consolidation of the ABCP programs of European banks).
170. New Rule, supra note 5, at 44,908.
171. Id. at 44,910. The FDIC tier one ratio is not affected. Id.
172. Id. at 44,909.
173. Id. at 44,911.
174. Id. at 44,911.
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A fifth provision deals with application of market-based capital
requirements to ABCP programs.1
75
1. Exclusion of ABCP Program Assets
An eligible ABCP program consolidated by FIN 46R can be
excluded from the calculation of both Tier 1176 and Total Risk-Based
(R-B) Capital. 177 For purposes of the rule, an eligible ABCP program is
defined as one that "primarily issues (that is, more than 50 percent)
externally rated commercial paper backed by assets or other exposures
held in a bankruptcy-remote, special purpose entity." 178  Only ABCP
programs that meet this definition are granted the exclusion. 7
9 Since
the ABCP program assets are taken out of the denominator of the ratio,
it is logical to also exclude from Tier 1 and total capital the minority
interests associated with consolidated ABCPs. 180
175. Id. at 44,912. The market based capital requirements provision is beyond the scope
of this Note.
176. 12 C.F.R. pt. 3, app. A § 2(a) (2004). Tier 1 (Core) Capital is common
stockholders' equity, noncumulative perpetual preferred stock, and minority interests in the
equity accounts of consolidated subsidiaries. Id. Exclusion of ABCP programs does not
also affect the denominator of tier 1 leverage capital ratio, which is not risk based, and will
continue to be based on book values as calculated by GAAP. New Rule, supra note 5, at
44,909-10; see 12 C.F.R. 325.4 (2004).
177. New Rule, supra note 5, at 44,910. Total Capital includes Tier 1 capital plus, inter
alia, loan loss reserves, and hybrid instruments which have characteristics of both debt and
equity. 12 C.F.R. pt. 3, app. 3 § 2(b). The inclusion of ABCP programs would have the
effect of lowering the capital ratio by increasing the size of the denominator the capital ratio
fraction. For example:
Before FIN 46 After FIN 46 consolidation With RBCG exclusion
Risk-adjusted Assets 1000 1100 1000
Liabilities 960 1060 960
Capital 40 40 40
Capital ratio is 4%. Capital ratio is now 3.6%. Capital ratio is again 4%.
It is within the guidelines. It is below the guidelines. Corrective measures are
The entity must increase no longer needed.
capital or decrease assets.
(For simplicity's sake, these examples assume that the ACBPs are financed entirely with
debt.)
178. New Rule, supra note 5, at 44,910.
179. Id.
180. Id. at 44,909-10. Minority interests arise because accounting standards call for full,
rather than partial consolidation of subsidiary companies. HARIED, ET AL., supra, note 95, at
56. For example, Company A owns 80% of the stock of Company B. Company A is
required to add all of Company B's net assets to its own for the consolidation, and the
minority share is added to the capital section of the balance sheet to balance it, and to show
NORTH CAROLINA BANKING INSTITUTE
2. Liquidity Facilities
Liquidity facilities, though not presented on the balance sheet,
represent real risks to the bank from the ABCP program.'18  While the
consolidated assets related to ABCP programs are excluded from the R-
B capital ratio calculation under the new rule, the liquidity facilities, as
a real risk arising from an ABCP program, are analyzed to see if they
should be included in the calculation, and capital provided for them. 82
The liquidity facilities are further analyzed to determine the amount of
capital needed. 8 3 The regulators determined that long-term 184 liquidity
facilities should use a fifty percent conversion factor,'85 and that short-
term 8 6 facilities use a ten percent conversion factor.' 87  After the
conversion factors are applied, each liquidity facility is grouped in the
risk weight categories according to its underlying assets'88 and risk-
weighted like similar types of assets.' 89
The liquidity facility rules apply even if the program does not
meet the ABCP program definition required for exclusion of the ABCP
program from consolidated assets, because the risk of the liquidity
facility does not depend on whether or not it is provided to an ABCP
program. 90 On the other hand, if the ABCP program's risks are
captured through the consolidation of its assets, and not excluded under
the new rule; there is not an additional capital assessment against its
liquidity facilities.' 9'
3. Asset Quality
The fifty percent and ten percent conversion factors apply only
the minority interests' participation in the profits of the Company B. Id.
181. New Rule, supra note 5, at 44,910.
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. New Rule, supra note 5, at 44,911. Long term, for purposes of the regulation,
means one year or more. Id.
185. Id.
186. Id. Short term, for purposes of the regulation, means less than one year. Id.
187. New Rule, supra note 5, at 44,911.
188. See discussion supra Part III.A.
189. New Rule, supra note 5, at 44,911.




to liquidity facilities for ABCP programs that pass an asset quality test.
If the liquidity facility is found ineligible according to this test, it is
treated as a direct credit substitute or recourse and assigned a one-
hundred percent conversion factor. 1
92
The asset quality test has two components.1 93 First, the assets
backed by the liquidity facilities may not be more than ninety days past
due. 194 If the underlying assets are more than ninety days past due, they
are automatically assigned the one hundred percent conversion 
factor. 95
If the underlying assets pass the first hurdle, they move to the 
second. 196
If the assets are externally rated, the liquidity facilities can only fund
investment grade securities. 197 If the liquidity facility fails either of
these tests, it is treated as a direct credit substitute or recourse and
assigned a one-hundred percent conversion factor.1
98
4. Overlapping Exposures
If the same bank has an overlapping exposure to the same SPE,
it needs to include the risk only once in its R-B capital calculation.'
99
For example, if a bank provides both liquidity facilities for one hundred
percent of the assets and credit enhancement 200 for ten percent of its
losses, it needs to provide supporting capital only once.20' It will need
to provide capital for the whole ten percent of the credit enhancement,
but only for the remaining ninety percent of the liquidity facility. 20 2 If
the underlying assets for the overlapping exposure have differing risk
weights, the highest must be used in the R-B calculation.20 3 The




195. New Rule, supra note 5, at 44,912. However, the 90 day requirement does not apply
if the underlying assets also have government guarantees. Id.
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. Id. at 44,912.
199. Id. at 44,911.
200. See supra text accompanying note 61.
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apply across different banks.204 That is, if different banks are providing
the overlapping exposures, each bank should include the maximum of
its own exposure in the R-B calculation.2"5
IV. ANALYSIS
In some ways, exclusion of ABCP program assets 20 6 from the R-
B capital ratio appears to comport with sound policy. First of all, FIN
46R 207 is apparently born of a desire to "do something now," to try to
save the reputation of the accounting profession and may not be as well-
reasoned as it might have been.20 8 Its revision less than a year after its
issuance is evidence of the hastiness with which it was first
promulgated. 20 9 If it was hasty and ill-considered, there seems to be no
reason for its provisions to bind bank regulators.
Second, even if FIN 46R is well-reasoned and well-considered,
Enron-like SPEs, which the standard is meant to capture, and bank SPEs
are not analogous. 210 Enron's SPEs appear to have been established for
the singular purpose of defrauding investors, while bank SPEs serve a
legitimate financing purpose. 21' Further, bank sponsored SPEs have
controls over their operation and structure that reduce the bank's risk
exposure to those SPEs.212 If risk exposures are sufficiently addressed
in these other ways, then there is no need to address them again by
including the SPEs captured by FIN 46R in the capital ratio
calculations.
Third, even if Enron and banks SPEs were analogous, FIN 46R
is not tailored for the needs of the banking industry and bank
regulators.1 3 FIN 46R is trying to provide as much information as
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. See supra text accompanying note 79.
207. Discussion of the usefulness of FIN 46R in other contexts is beyond the scope of
this note. This note is concerned solely with the effect on bank capital ratios from
consolidating ABCP programs.
208. Davenport, supra note 1, at 16-17.
209. See discussion supra Part II.D.
210. See discussion supra Part II.C.
211. See discussion supra Part II.C.
212. New Rule, supra note 5, at 44,909.
213. FIN 46R, supra note 3, at 10-11. There are several exceptions to the
implementation requirements of FIN 46; bank ABCP programs are not among them. Id.
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possible to investors about the financial condition of the company. z 4 In
light of Enron, FASB seems to prefer to err on the side of providing too
much information for them, even if the information is not particularly
relevant. If the information is not relevant to the risk exposure of banks,
there seems to be no need to include it when calculating capital ratios
for banks.
Finally, even if FIN 46R had been tailored for the financial
reporting needs of the banking industry, the R-B capital ratios are not
primarily concerned with financial reporting.1 5 Investors who are
considering the purchase of bank stocks are looking at financial
statements to predict future profits, and higher leveraging generally
favors shareholders.21 6 On the other hand, bank regulators have a very
precise goal - safe and sound banks - banks that are able to sustain
in 211
operations in the face of losses over time, in order to meet the
demands of depositors for withdrawal. z 8  With that goal, bank
regulators were already carefully analyzing both on and off-balance
sheet transactions to identify risk, 219 and including the ABCP programs
on the balance sheet should not make it any more or less likely to be
analyzed by the bank regulatory agencies. In light of these four reasons,
there is some basis to consider that it is sound policy to exclude ABCPs
captured by FIN 46R from the capital ratio.22 °
On the other hand, there is some doubt that the new regulations
are sound policy, meaning that assets that are consolidated by FIN 46R
should be included in, not excluded from, the RBCG calculations.2
First of all, FIN 46R requires the primary beneficiaries of the SPE to
consolidate the assets and liabilities of the SPEs.222 If benefits do not
arise without risks,223 then the primary beneficiary logically is the entity
that is bearing most of the risk. If, then, a bank is adjudged by generally
accepted accounting principles to be the primary risk-bearer of the SPE,
214. See id. at 7.
215. See infra text accompanying note 218.
216. See supra text accompanying notes 12-15.
217. See BROOME & MARKHAM, supra note 16, at 578-79.
218. See supra text accompanying notes 19-21.
219. 12 C.F.R. pt. 3 app. A § 3 (2004).
220. See supra text accompanying notes 207-219.
221. See supra text accompanying notes 222-232
222. See discussion supra Part IID.
223. See discussion supra Part I.
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it makes sense for the bank to include the SPE with its balance sheet
assets so as to capture the risk of holding the SPE assets in its R-B
capital ratio calculation.
Besides the obvious factor of benefits following risk, another
reason for not having the new rule is the added complexity of
adjustments to balance sheet assets before making the risk-based capital
calculation. First, complexity increases the possibility of errors,224 so
the new R-B capital ratios will be less trustworthy than they would have
been otherwise. Second, complex rules tend to favor big banks that
have the resources to comply with them, which tends to further reduce
competition in an industry that has been continuously consolidating for
many years.225 American capitalism has long abhorred monopolies, so
the new rules cut, in their own small way, against that ideal.226 Taken
together, however, those two factors could cut the other way. 27 That is,
because consolidation has already occurred, big banks have the
resources to deal with the added complexity so that complexity is not a
reason that the new rule is not sound policy.
22
A further reason for not adopting the new rule is that in the
grand scheme of things, ABCP programs have a very small impact on
R-B capital ratios. Citibank, for example, increased its assets by $2.1
billion as a result of FIN 46R.229 Impressive at first sight, the amount is
only a small fraction of Citibank's $1.2 trillion of assets on the books at
December 31, 2003.230 Further, banks that can follow the letter of the
224. This conclusion was drawn by the author in over a decade of supervising
accounting staff. Inevitably, new complexities in either the organization or its accounting
system were met with errors. It is the foundational assumption of the well-known K.I.SS.
(keep it simple stupid) principle.
225. See Vice Chairman Roger W. Ferguson, Jr., Remarks at the International Banking
and Financial Systems Conference, Bank of Italy, Rome, Italy (March 9, 2001), available at
http://www.federalreserve.govIboarddocs/speeches/2001/20010309/default.htm.
226. See, e.g., Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Ky., 161 U.S. 677, 688 (1896) (holding that a
law prohibiting monopolies was a valid exercise of the state's police power); see also
GROUP OF 10, CONSOLIDATION IN THE FINANCIAL SECTOR 25 (2001),
http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/speeches/2001/20010125/attachment I .pdf. This
negative becomes a positive, of course, if one assumes that bigger is better when it comes to
banks.
227. Comments of Lissa L. Broome, Wachovia Term Professor of Banking Law,
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill School of Law (Nov. 9, 2004).
228. Id.
229. CITIBANK, INC., 2003 FINANCIAL STATEMENTS 114 (2004), available at
http://citicorp.com/citigroup/fin/data/ar032c.pdf (last visited Jan. 10, 2005).
230. Id. at 103; see also Citi's New Stance, CFO MAGAZINE, Nov. 2003, at 3-4;
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law in structuring transactions for the ABCP programs are still able to
keep the SPEs off the books, further minimizing the effect of FIN
46R.23' With such a small impact even at first sight, and the potential
for an even smaller impact if banks restructure their SPEs, any benefit
accruing from the new rule may not exceed the cost of implementation.
The cost of compliance could be high in any case, because the new rule
moves the reporting requirements of the banking regulators and the SEC
further apart, which brings more government bureaucracy, and
accompanying inefficiency.232
Adding the analysis of the liquidity position as a corollary to
excluding the ABCP programs from the R-B capital ratio seems
consistent with the regulators' previous efforts to consider the real risks
to banks.233 An analysis of the liquidity position focuses on what is
really significant in the capital rules, the risk that the bank might not be
able to meet the demands of its depositors. 4  This approach is
consistent with the regulators' existing position of including off-balance
sheet exposure in the R-B calculation.235 On the other hand, an
argument against the liquidity position analysis is that it adds yet
another layer of complexity to regulations that are already quite
complex, and it would be easier to leave the ABCP programs in the total
assets used in the capital calculation and not analyze their
accompanying liquidity facilities. 6
The position on overlapping exposures does not seem to be a
contested issue, and there was no record of any comments received on it
during the comment period.237 The only argument raised by the new
rule against recognition of overlapping exposures was that there is some
duplication of risk acknowledgment on a system-wide basis across the
entire banking industry. 8  The main argument in favor of the asset
Interview with Citigroup CFO Todd Thomson, at http://www.cfo.com/article.cfm/3010699
(last visited Jan. 10, 2005) [hereinafter Thomson].
231. See, e.g., Thomson, supra note 230, at 2.
232. Id. at 4-5.
233. Risk-Based Capital Guidelines, 54 Fed. Reg. 4,168-69 (Jan. 27, 1989) (to be
codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 3)..
234. See supra notes 19-21 and accompanying text.
235. 12 C.F.R. pt. 3 app. A § 3(b) (2004); see supra text accompanying notes 147-149.
236. See discussion supra Part III.B.2.
237. New Rule, supra note 5, at 44,911.
238. Id.
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quality test is that it gives a more precise measurement of risk, which is
the whole purpose of the RBCG. The complexity arguments noted
above also apply to the asset quality test.239
V. CONCLUSION
There are fundamental differences between the functions of the
SEC and federal bank regulators, so it seems very plausible that the
information needs of the two would be in conflict from time to time. n°
The SEC's purpose is to provide an abundance of information, so that
investors can make informed choices.24' Whatever risk an investor
wants to bear, seeking a return, is up to her. Further, the SEC's efforts
to provide information apply to all public companies, and financial
statement comparability across industries is important for investors.242
The SEC 24 3 apparently prefers detailed, 244 bright-line rules as an antidote
to creative accounting and an atmosphere where fraud is more likely to
arise. 245  Enron is a classic case, though, of how the spirit of an
accounting standard can be grossly violated while complying with its
letter.246
In contrast to the SEC, the federal bank regulators deal only
with banks.247 The import of their decisions to public confidence in the
banking industry248 suggests that the extra work required to have
precision in the R-B calculation is worth the effort.
Though the formulation of R-B capital ratio rules expressly
considered developments in international banking, the new rule leaves
some questions unanswered.249 Chief among them is what will happen
239. See supra note 224 and accompanying text.
240. Compare supra text accompanying notes 19-2 1, with infra text accompanying notes
241-242.
241. SEC, WHO WE ARE, WHAT WE Do, at http://sec.gov/about/whatwedo.shtml (last
visited Jan. 10, 2005); see also Melanie Fein, Banks and the Securities Laws, SEC. REG.
BANKS& THRIFTS (1991), 839-40.
242. See FIN 46R, supra note 3, at 7; see also supra note 2.
243. See supra note 2.
244. But see Davenport, supra note 1, at 16-17 (noting that there are trends toward
principles based accounting and away from detailed rules).
245. See, e.g., FIN 46R, supra note 3.
246. See, e.g., MCLEAN, supra note 83, at 157-58 (2003)
247. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
248. See supra notes 17-19 and accompanying text.
249. Risk-Based Capital Guidelines, 54 Fed. Reg. 4168, 4169 (Jan. 27, 1989) (codified at
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as all EU countries convert to International Accounting Standards in
2005 and adopt SIC 12?250 The IASB advocated for "beneficial
interest" consolidation long before FASB did.251  Will the bank
regulators need to re-think the new R-B capital rule when the financial
statements of European banks include newly consolidated SPEs in
accordance with SIC 12, or will European bank regulators follow the
Americans' lead and have banks exclude ABCPs in calculating capital
ratios?
The new regulation has answered some questions while raising
others. Whether or not it works in the implementation remains to be
seen.
LEE GILLIAM
12 C.F.R. pt. 3) (providing useful background information on the rationale for the R-B
capital rules).
250. See supra note 99.
251. Id.
2005] 315
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